‘In reformulating her programme about how to best understand or elucidate mathematical axioms in her book, Defending the Axioms, Penelope Maddy articulates a view called „neutralism”, similar in purport to views held by Rudolf Carnap and Arthur Fine, and which seems to best fit with her second philosophy and naturalism in the foundations of mathematics. As I construe it, neutralism is a programmatic deflationism about the relevance to the foundations of mathematics of metaphysical statements. One objection to neutralism might be that the foundational crisis in the 1900’s and the ensuing axiomatizations of set theory are rife with metaphysical concern, both with whether sets exist and with what the nature of sets might be. Consider, for example, Skolem’s discussion of the Axiom of Choice, and his distinction between real sets and objects we may choose to call „sets” in light of a theory of them. I argue that neutralism survives this objection. Granted, genuine, first-philosophical, metaphysical concern with what sets are clearly cannot be dismissed in some historical episodes. But that concession falls short of showing a principled basis for always turning first-philosophical. How some foundational problems are framed (e.g. in the foundational crisis of the 1900’s) might at first be metaphysically perplexing. As time goes by, orthodoxy (ZFC) sets in practice and alternative set theories begin to be explored in an experimental and tolerant spirit. New reasons for endorsing orthodoxy emerge (e.g. the iterative hierarchy as an intuitive picture), and practice begins once more to unfold in agreement with more pragmatic, and less ontologically inflated, descriptions. If metaphysical concerns come and go, neutralist views are on firm footing: they can just wait it out. To say this particular objection falls short is, by my lights, no final defense of neutralism as true. Indeed, I see deflationism about truth as consonant with neutralism about sets.’

Între 21 și 25 mai 2024 se desfășoară conferința „Playing in VR: Imagination, Affordances and Aesthetic Experience” și atelierul „Digital Art Practices and Theoretical Assessment”, ambele organizate de Universitatea din Antwerp, Belgia.
Tematica simpozionului este bazată pe aspectul relațional al jocului în Realitatea Virtuală, dar este variată, incepând cu întrebări legate de metafizică, până la domeniul experienței estetice.

Participanții sunt cercetători de pe cuprinsul UE, iar printre vorbitorii invitați se numără Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis), Pawel Grabarczyk (University of Lodz), Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College), Tom McClelland (Cambridge University), Nele Van de Mosselaer (Tilburg University).

Din partea Facultății de Filosofie a Universității din București va participa drd. Sandra Brânzaru, ce va susține o comunicare cu titlul “Playing with others in VR”. Mai multe detalii despre eveniment sunt disponibile la link-ul https://zrucinska.wixsite.com/playinginvr/organisation și https://philevents.org/event/show/118793