Seminar cercetare DFT „Understanding causation in virtual reality”

„In the more recent analytic philosophy of time there has been too little attention toward the idea that some metaphysical theories of time may conflict with free will. While the problem of logical fatalism has been a popular subject in the philosophy of time, much less attention has been given to the relationship between the metaphysics of time and free will. Authors such as Nathan Oaklander (1998), Carl Hoefer (2002) and Jennan Ismael (2016) have defended the idea that eternalism (or the B-theory) does not pose a threat to human free will, but it would seem that their account of freedom is more in line with the traditional compatibilist view of free will.
It is possible that certain other conceptions of free will may be under threat by certain metaphysics of time. For example, when agents make decisions, they typically suppose that there is some sense in which the future is open to possibilities. Libertarian free will (the ability to do otherwise) requires an agent to have (at the moment of choice) multiple alternate possibilities from which to choose. But if eternalism (or the B-theory of time) is true, then it would seem, at least prima facie, that the future is not open to possibilities. Eternalism, after all, is the thesis that all events (including past and future events) are equally real. Future events are just as real as past and present events according to this theory of time. This could imply that the future is metaphysically closed and fixed. To the libertarian, this may mean that the only choice available to any agent is the one that is already part of the actual future. One can thus believe that eternalism is incompatible with libertarian free will.As Niall Shanks (1994) argued, libertarian free will seems to be incompatible with such a theory of time. To Shanks, a theory of time in which future events and objects are ontologically equal to past and present ones is inhospitable to libertarian free will. He claimed that one of the reasons for this is because the agent lacks existential control: the ability to bring events and objects into existence.
Recently Ben Page (2022) has argued that the incompatibility between eternalism and libertarian free will is merely apparent. The two may indeed be compatible. In this paper I argue, contrary to Ben Page (2022), that a strong case can be made for the thesis that eternalism is not compatible with libertarian free will. I briefly survey the A- and B-theories of time, present Shanks’ (1994) argument and defend my own argument for the thesis that eternalism and libertarian free will are incompatible. I then respond to possible objections in order to defend the thesis.”
„Teoria relativității și mecanica cuantică reprezintă o atracție permanentă pentru filosofii științei. Sunt două motive pentru care domeniile menționate au devenit subiecte favorite pentru filosofie (practic ele au creat filosofia științei ca disciplină independentă de studiu): (i) Experimentele controlate care să confirme teoria sunt foarte dificil de realizat, rezultatele experimentale obținute fiind de regulă neconcludente; (ii) Aparatul matematic este complicat iar ecuațiile ce modelează fenomenele observabile nu au de regulă soluții exacte. Deci, s-a simțit nevoia unor analize complementare științelor exacte, a unor abordări structurale și epistemologice asupra fenomenelor în cauză. Se poate spune că filosofia a preluat în știință rolul important și necesar al criticii în artă. Nu trebuie să fii fizician pentru a analiza impactul relativității și mecanicii cuantice în mentalul societății, așa cum un critic de artă nu este necesar să fie creator de artă. Când ne apropiem de o parte a științei mai domestică, cum ar fi mecanica fluidelor, lucrurile se schimbă: experimentul este facil și rezultatele teoriei pot fi relativ ușor confirmate sau infirmate (cel puțin așa se vede din exteriorul domeniului). Poate din aceste motive mecanica fluidelor nu a fost un punct de atracție inițial pentru filosofia științei. În ultimele decade situația dinamicii studiilor s-a modificat, mecanica fluidelor devenind un spațiu științific de interes major pentru istoria și filosofia științei. Prezentarea mea sper să convingă auditoriul de acest lucru.”
„In this presentation I will start by introducing the Dark room problem and the solutions offered to it by Karl Friston, Andy Clark and others, under the Free Energy Principle framework. I will then formalize the Dark room problem, discuss its versions and understand how the premises and its conclusion were treated by Friston and others, essentially rejecting the intermediate conclusion that agents tend to inhabit Dark rooms. In the end, I will propose my own solution to the Dark room problem, showing that agents do tend to inhabit dark rooms in many occasions and this is an effective solution to the problem of reducing free energy. This goes against the usual opinion of Free Energy Principle proponents. What is in accordance with Friston and others is the idea that agents tend not to stay too long in these dark rooms due to the fact that this does not lead to long term reduction of free energy. Long term reduction of free energy will not happen because of average short term free energy, as Friston suggests, but rather due to other processes that are simply linked to models that have long term reduction of free energy as their objective. An essential part here lies with the amended Free Energy Principle that I propose, according to which agents can receive direct input parameters, instead of using their own statistical models for reducing free energy. This helps with explaining why human agents do not fall over long periods of time into the trap of Dark room problem. It is because engaging in reach social and cultural environments reduces the free energy over long term due to the use of direct input parameters, as explained by the amended Free Energy Principle.”
Ultima conferință din cadrul seminarului nostru de cercetare DFT-CELFIS pe anul 2022/2023 va fi susținută de Constantin Stoenescu, director al Departamentului de Filosofie Teoretică al Universității din București. Prezentarea sa este intitulată „Ce a crezut Darwin că vede în Insulele Galapagos?„.
Conferința se va desfășura miercuri, 31 mai, orele 16.00-17.30, în amfiteatrul „Titu Maiorescu”, etajul 1, de la sediul Facultății de Filosofie: Splaiul Independenței nr. 204, București 060024.