In this talk, I examine Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy (1945/1959), which identifies Force as the central ontological category of the Bantus such that being is Force. I situate his claims in dialogue with Hountondji’s African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1976/1983), which critiques ethnophilosophy for imposing external categories and conflating collective beliefs with philosophy. I outline Tempels’s three possible relations: being as distinct from force, force as part of being, and being as force, and note his view that Bantu thought embraces the third, according to which being and force are identical. I analyze whether this framework can allow a genuine philosophical encounter or, as Hountondji argues, it is a colonial construction. I further explore how Force functions methodologically, shaping and being shaped by interpretive frameworks. Revisiting the fundamental question of “What is it?” reveals Force as both an ontological principle and an analytic tool. I conclude by showing how Hountondji’s methodological rigor offers a framework to refine African metaphysical categories for contemporary engagement.  

”This paper proposes a functional approach to ‘perspectival realism’—especially in its most recent form, developed by M. Massimi (Massimi 2016; 2018; 2019; Massimi and McCoy 2020) and P. Teller (Teller 2018; 2020)—by providing a functional role of perspectives in the ‘representational success’ of scientific models. The paper promotes a probabilistic account of the role perspectives play in the representational function of models and, as part of the argument, addresses two issues: (a) the convergence of models based on different perspectives and (b) the role of perspectives in the scientific entailment from ensembles of models. We offer an example inspired by a computational model. In general, this paper connects better perspectives to the representational function of models and promotes perspectival realism as a promising framework for discussing computational models within a scientific realism framework.”

Massimi, Michela. 2016. “Three Tales of Scientific Success.” Philosophy of Science 83 (5): 757–67. https://doi.org/10.1086/687861.———. 2018. “Perspectival Modeling.” Philosophy of Science 85 (3): 335–59.

———. 2019. “Two Kinds of Exploratory Models.” Philosophy of Science 86 (5): 869–81. https://doi.org/10.1086/705494.

Massimi, Michela, and Casey D. McCoy, eds. 2020. Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects. 1st ed. Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science ; 20. New York : Taylor & Francis, 2019: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315145198.

Teller, Paul. 2018. “Referential and Perspectival Realism.” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 9 (1): 151–64.https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v9i1.26990.———. 2020. “What Is Perspectivism, and Does It Count as Realism?” In Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects, edited by Michela Massimi and Casey D. McCoy, 1 edition, 49–64. Routledge.

Următoarea prezentare din cadrul seriei de seminare de cercetare ale Departamentului de Filosofie Teoretică în parteneriat cu CELFIS aparține  prof. Sorin Bangu (Universitatea din Bergen, https://www4.uib.no/en/find-employees/Sorin.Bangu). Titlul prezentării sale faţă în faţă este „Wittgenstein on Cantor’s diagonal argument”.

Comunicarea acestuia este parte dintr-un ciclu de conferințe asociat programului masteral „Analytic Philosophy„. Aceste evenimente sunt deschise studenților în filosofie, psihologie, antropologie, științe politice, jurnalism, sociologie, lingvistică, digital humanities, științele comunicării, și multe altele. Detaliile programului sunt disponibile aici: https://filosofie.unibuc.ro/master-of-arts-in-analytic-philosophy/

Prezentarea se va desfășura joi, 8 mai 2025, orele 18.00-20.00, în sala de consiliu de la etajul 1 al Facultății de Filosofie din Splaiul Independenței nr. 204, București 060024.