Seminar cercetare DFT ‘Conceptualising Empathy’
Meeting ID: 852 1989 6977 Passcode: 971234
Iconic Imagination in Modeling: A Semiotic Approach to Scientific Inquiry
I propose a semiotic contribution to philosophy of science in regard to imagination.
Often associated with the discovery of novel order and creativity, the imagination has been traditionally overlooked in philosophy of science. As recent cognitive sciences are placing imagination (Brandt 2020; Paolucci 2021) at the centre of all mind work, as capacity to meaningfully organize mental representations, philosophical reflection on scientific inquiry has also begun to pay attention to it (Frigg 2010; Levy & Godfrey-Smith 2020).I reflect on the role of imagination in scientific inquiry by adopting three connected theories:
(1) Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics (CP 7.206–217; 7.366),
(2) cognitive semantics, and
(3) cognitive semiotics.My argument is that while imagination is at work at every step of scientific inquiry, it particularly consists in abductive inferences, the incipient stage of hypothesizing (CP 1.46; 5.181). Proposing a hypothesis requires imagining it.
On this view, I construe the work of imagination in the context of (scientific) modeling as icon (signifying similarities, CP 3.362) manipulation. I argue that scientific inquiry unfolds within media affordances that at the same time make discovery possible and constrain it. From this perspective, understanding scientific inquiry requires considering situatedness (Massimi 2022), both cognitive and technological.
I explain that this semiotic conceptualization can shed light on the expansion of human imagination through emerging technologies, among which, most prominent, electronic computers. To develop my argument, I explicate some anecdotes of scientific discovery as icon manipulation, with a consideration of the heuristics stemming from modeling as transmedial.
Keywords: icon; modeling; imagination; simulation; scientific inquiry.
References
Brandt, P. A. (2020). Cognitive semiotics: Signs, mind and meaning. Bloomsbury.
Frigg, R. (2010). Models and fiction. Synthese, 172, 251–268.
Levy, A., & Godfrey-Smith, P. (Eds.). (2020). The scientific imagination: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Massimi, M. (2022). Perspectival realism. Oxford University Press.
Paolucci, C. (2021). Cognitive semiotics: Integrating signs, minds, meaning and cognition. Springer.
Peirce, C. S. (1958). The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (Vols. 1–8, C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, & A. W. Burks, Eds.). Harvard University Press.
In this talk, I examine Tempels’s Bantu Philosophy (1945/1959), which identifies Force as the central ontological category of the Bantus such that being is Force. I situate his claims in dialogue with Hountondji’s African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1976/1983), which critiques ethnophilosophy for imposing external categories and conflating collective beliefs with philosophy. I outline Tempels’s three possible relations: being as distinct from force, force as part of being, and being as force, and note his view that Bantu thought embraces the third, according to which being and force are identical. I analyze whether this framework can allow a genuine philosophical encounter or, as Hountondji argues, it is a colonial construction. I further explore how Force functions methodologically, shaping and being shaped by interpretive frameworks. Revisiting the fundamental question of “What is it?” reveals Force as both an ontological principle and an analytic tool. I conclude by showing how Hountondji’s methodological rigor offers a framework to refine African metaphysical categories for contemporary engagement.