Următoarea conferință din cadrul seminarului de cercetare al Departamentului de Filosofie Teoretică în parteneriat cu CELFIS va fi susținută de dr. Nora Grigore, cercetător în cadrul Institutului de Filosofie și Psihologie „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru” al Academiei Române. Mai multe detalii despre publicațiile sale recente sunt disponibile aici: https://orcid.org/0000-
„Can supererogation be accounted for in a Kantian framework? The answer to this question is famously disputed by Thomas Hill (‘Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation’) and Marcia Baron (‘Kantian Ethics and Supererogation’). Usually, disputes about supererogation bring to the surface basic presuppositions about important concepts like moral obligation, duty or morality itself. This dispute is no exception. I argue that the Kantian text can be interpreted to accomodate two different conceptions about morality and, in consequence, one may have two different ways of relating Kantianism to supererogation.
Morality can be seen as arduous, demanding, centered on obligations and rules and usually going against the personal interest of the agent. Alternatively, it can be seen as going along with the interest of the agent, contributing to personal development, not centered upon obligations, but on aspirations, and only accidentally difficult.Therefore, we might end up with two main ways of seeing morality: morality as a difficult enterprise, usually going against the interest and the well-being of the moral agent; or, morality as a not-so-difficult enterprise, because usually not going against the interest of the moral agent (i.e. morality as something that comes, in some sense, naturally to the moral agent). I have called the first kind ‘morality of law’ because in order to secure the moral agent’s compliance it relies on rules and obligations as its core. I have contrasted this way of seeing morality with a view usually called ‘morality of virtue’ which does not rely on rules and obligations as its main instruments, but relies rather on moral aspirations and moral ideals. This contrast is, obviously, not new. I am borrowing the labels ‘morality of law’ and ‘morality of virtue’ from MacIntyre inAfter Virtue, even if I do not fully employ his way of depicting the contrast between the two. Another similar distinction is made by Korsgaard inThe Sources of Normativity(1996).
My aim is to see how these two ways of seeing morality can be accommodated by the Kantian framework when speaking about supererogation.
„Conferința se va desfășura luni, 20 mai, orele 16.00-18.00, în amfiteatrul „Constantin Rădulescu-Motru” de la etajul 1 al Facultății de Filosofie din Splaiul Independenței nr. 204, București 060024. Pentru mai multe detalii, vă rugăm urmăriți pagina Facebook „Seminarul Departamentului de Filosofie Teoretica UniBuc”.„